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Abs t r a ct
Thi s pap e r descri b es a pri nci pal -a gen t rel at i onshi p with a su p ervi so r who h a s
i nfo rmation a b out the agen t. Th e agen t and t he sup ervisor h a v e the p ossi bi li t y
to co l l ude a n d misi nform t h e pri nci pal. F rom the l iterat ur e w e kno wt hat there
exi st s an opti m al con t ract whic h excl udes col lu sion i n equi l ib r i um. Th e o pt i mal
con tr act, ho w ev er, i s ex p ost i ne ￿ c ien t and creates scop e for r e nego ti at i on. If
renegotiation i s all o w ed t he n un der som e para meter constel lations the o pt i mal
con tr act is a con t ract whic h necessaril y i nduc es co l l usi o n. T h e pap er th us sho ws
that the p r i nc ipal ’ s b eha vior to w a rd e x p ost i ne￿c ien cie s m a y determi ne whether
coll usi on o ccu rs in equi li bri um.
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1 In tro duc ti on
In re cen ty e ar s e con om i sts hav e extende d the sta ndard hie ra rc hic a l princi pa l -a gen tm o del
b y incl uding a thi rd pla y er: the s up erv iso r. The e xtension can b e us e d to analyz e
situations in whic h the pri nc ipal i sa b l et oa c quire inform ation a b ou t th e a gen t from
other econom ic a gen ts. T he p r o ble m whic ha r i ses i n these situations i st h e m anipulation
of inform ation. Since the p ri nci pa l m a y use the su p erv iso r’ s inform ation to disci pli ne
the a gen t, the a gen t h as an i ncen tiv et oc ol lude with the sup erv isor an d m anipulate the
inform ati o n whic hi ss e n t to the pri ncipal. A ni m p orta n t questi on i s then whether in
eq ui li brium the princ ipal w i ll o￿ e rc on tra c ts whic he xcl ude suc h form s o f coll usion. This
pap er sh o ws that the an sw e rt ot h i s question m a yd e p end o n t h e pri nc ipal’ sb e ha vior
to w ard co n tra c ts whic h turn o ut to b e i ne￿c ien te x p ost. If she i se xp e cted to renego ti ate
suc h con tracts, then she m i gh t stri ctly pre fer coll us i o n to tak e place in eq uil ibrium .
W e dev el o pam o del in whic hr e ne g otiati o n det erm i nes whether c ol lusion wil l tak e
place in e quil ibri um .I f the pri ncipal ca n com m i t no t to renego ti at e then the re e xists
an o pti m a l con tract for whic hc o l lusion do es not ta k ep l ac ei ne quil ibrium . Giv en a
ce rta i n para m eter constel lation the optim al con tract is, ho w ev er, no t ex p o st e￿ cie n t. I f
the pri nc ipal and th e a gen t a re able to re neg oti at e , they wil l ado pt a di￿eren t con tract
later in the gam e. Si nce ra ti o nal pla y ers wi ll an tic ipate the c ha nge, they wil lm od i fy
thei r b e h a v ior a nd the c on tr ac t i sn ol o nger op ti m al. When w em o del the rene g otiation
ex p l ic itl y , thep r i nci p al s tri ctl y prefe rs to o￿ e r con tra c ts w hi c hi ndu c e col lusion to tak e
place in eq uil ibrium . The pap er there fo re s ho ws tha t the princ ipal’s b eha vi or t o w a rds
ex p ost ine￿ ci enci es ha s a dire ct im pa c t o n whethe r coll us i o n tak es place i ne q ui li brium .
Th e m o del w e study is a p r o curem en tm od e l with asym m etri c inform ation. The
princ ipal ha s a pro ject of ￿ x ed s i ze, whi c ha na g e n t ca n reali ze . The a gen t and a
sup e rvisor kno w the e xact cost of the pro je ct, whil e the p ri nci p al do es not. T he princi pa l
w an ts to e li cit the inform ation from the sup ervi s or, i n order t o determ ine the approp ri ate
trans fe r to the a gen t for reali zi ng th e pro jec t. If th e con tract is i ncreasing with th e cost
rep orted b y the s up ervi so r, then the agen t h as an inc en ti v e to brib e the sup e rvisor
to rep o r t higher c o sts. If suc h brib ery is p os si bl e a nd the princi pa l i sa w are of thi s,
t hen shei sin te rested in si g nals whic h tel ls o m ethi n g ab out the l ik eli ness tha t c ol lusion
o c curred.
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Ev e nw h e n these signa l s a re im p erfe ct, it i s o pti m al for the pri nc ipal to
conditi o n the co n tra c t on the signa l s, s i nce this reduces the a ttracti v e ness of bri bi ng .
The i m p erfec tness of the s i g nal cre a tes s c o p e fo r renego ti ation: Once th e pri nc ipal h as
ensured a truthful rep o rt, s he prefers to c ha nge the con tract. She d o es no long e rw an t
to con di tion the con tract on th e s i gn al, since it m a yg i v e wrong i ndications. Pre v e n ting
1
In thi sp a p er brib e ry a nd c ol lusio n are treate d a s synon ym s.3
coll usion a nd conditi on i ng the con tract on th e exte rna l signa l a re inc om patibl e and will
le a d to re ne g otiati o n. The princ ipal has to c ho ose b et w e en ei ther all o wing collusi on t o
tak e place a nd to conditi on he r con tract on the exte rna l signa l , or to prev en tc ol lusion
and o￿er a con tract whic hi sn o tc o ndi tioned on th e signa l .W es h o w that there e xists
a para m eter constell ation suc h that i ti s optim a l for the pri nci pa l t o c ho ose th e f or m er
pol icy .
Be fo re i n tro duci ng the m o del w e wil l brie￿y disc us s r e lated li teratu re whic h addresses
the o cc urrence of co l lusi o n in equi libri um . The l iterature on coll usion i n princ ipal-
sup e rvisor- agen tm o del w as initi at ed b yT i ro l e (198 6). The pap e r stud i es an a genc y
m o del wi th adv erse sele cti o n and m oral hazard, i n whic h the sup ervi so r m a y observ e
inform ati on abou t t h e a ge n t’s t yp e. T i ro l e sho w s tha t there e xists an o pti m al con tract
whic h do es not induce c ol lusion. Kofm an a nd La w ar r ￿ ee (19 94) s t u dy a thre e tie r hierar-
c h ym o del i n whic h there are t w o sup erv isors , w ho c an b e e m pl o y e d sim ultaneous l y . The
￿rst su p erv iso r i s cos tl ess to de pl o y ,b u t s e ns i tiv e to coll us i o n. The sec o nd sup er visor is
uncorruptible , but ex pe ns i v e .K o f m an a nd La w ar r ￿ ee sho w that, dep ending on the cost
of em plo yi ng t h e second sup e rvisor, c ol lusion b et w een the a gen t and the c o rrupti bl e su-
p ervi so r o c curs wi th s tri ctl y p ositi v e p robab i li t yi n equi li br i um .S c hee pe ns (199 5) s ho ws
that coll us i on t ak es place in e quil ibri um when the princi pa l can m onitor c ol lusion, but
when m on i to ri ng is un v e ri￿able. The coll usion prob l em i s then tra nsform ed in t o a sta n-
dard insp e ction ga m e. When m onitoring e￿ort is con tracti ble, the re ex ists a n optim al
c o n t r act for whic hc o l lusion do es not ta k ep l ac e i n e q uili brium . In Tirole (1 992 ) i ti s
s h o w n th at the princi pa l m ay prefe r to a dopt con tracts whi c hi ndu c ec ol lusion when the re
are di￿eren tt yp e s of sup ervi so rs w i th di ￿e ren tl e v e ls o f scruple .B ya l lo wing c ol lusion
to ta k e place b y thos e t y p es for whic hc ol lusion is m os t c o stly to prev en t the princi pa l
is able to scree nb e t w ee n the di￿eren tt yp es. Dep e nding on the para m eter c o nstel lation
scree ning m a y b e optim al .
Th e fact tha t optim al long- te rm con tracts whic h are e￿ cie n te xa n te m a y turn out to
b e ine￿ ci en t ex p ost in an adv e rse sele cti o n con te xt w a s ￿rst rec o gnize db y Dew atrip on t
(19 86 ) .H e poi n ted ou t that wh e n con tra c ting pa rti es a re a w a re of the i ne ￿ci enci es, then
they m a y dec ide to re ne g otiate a w a y the ine￿ cie ncy to the b e ne￿t of a l l a nd a dopt a
new c on tra c t. A s sum i ng tha t th e pri nc ipal wi ll no t renegotiate a c on tra c t when thi si s
b ene￿ci a l requi res e xtrem e com m i tm e n t cap abil iti es o n pa rt of the princi pa l .
Th e pap er is o rga ni zed as foll o ws . The next secti on i n tro duce s the general m o del.
Sec tion 3 deri v es the optim al c on tra c t of the ga m e an d poi n ts o ut the ex p os t i ne￿c ienc y
of t he c on tra c t. Secti o n4i n t r odu c es a nd a naly zes the g am ew i th re neg oti at i on . S e ction
5c on c ludes.4
2 The M o del
The pri nci p al has a pro ject whic h she v al ues at R.A s i ng l e agen t can reali ze the pro ject.
Ex an te i t is publi cl y kno wn tha t the cos t c of the pro je ct i s c
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. In order to learn m ore ab out the costs the
princ ipals e nd s a su p erv iso r to di sc us s th e pro je ct wi th the ag en t. During the discussion
the exact cos t o f the pro je ct is rev eale d to the a gen t and the s up ervi so r. W e hav e,
there fo re ,t w o p o ssibl et yp es of a gen ts and sup erv isors : a hi gh c o st and a l ow c os t a ge n t
and sup ervi s or. Afte r th e discussions the s up ervi so r re p orts the cost o f the pro j ect to
the princi pa l . T he rep ort, sp e ci fying whethe r the cos t is h i gh or lo w, do es not ne ed
to b e truthful. Th e agen t can b ri b e the sup ervi s o ri no r d e r to induce hi m to coll ude
and falsify the rep o rt r . C oll us i on m a y b e acc om p anie db y a pos i tiv et ra nsfer from
the a gen t to the sup e rvi s or, bu t no t vic ev ersa.
2
The tra nsfer is the n p a r to fa s i de-
con tract b e t w ee n the su p erv iso r an d the a gen t, sp e ci fying a pa ym en t conditi o nal o n the
sup e rvisor’s rep o rt. T rans f ers a re cos tl y and th e se costs are tak en to b e prop orti o nal to
thes i ze o f the t ra nsfer. The para m eter k 2 [0; 1] e xpresses thi s cos t. When the ag e n t
sends a tra nsfe r b , the s up erv iso r re cei v e s only kb .
3
W e d o not an al yze the barg aini ng pro cedure b yw h i c h the bri be b i s determ ine d.
W e a s su m e t h at barg aini ng b et w een the sup e rvisor a nd the ag e n tl e a d st o a ne ￿ c ie n t
outco m e. Whenev er there ex ists a s urpl u s from colludi ng , coll us i o n wil l indee d tak e
place . Ne ithe r do w e address the i s sue of e nfo rc eabili t yo f t he s i de -co n tra c t. W em e rel y
as sum ee nf o rce ab i li t y a nd o nl yh i n t tha t the di ￿cul tie s o f enforci ng the co n tra c tm a y
ex pl ain w h y bribing is cos tl y .
Afte r obta i ning the rep ort, the pri nci p al rec eiv e sas i g nal s 2f b; ng,w h i c hi si m p er-
fec tly c o rre lated with coll us i on . Wh e nc ol lusion ha s tak en pl ac e the princi pa l rece iv es
the si g nal s = b with proba bi lit y p an d t h e si g nal s = n with pro babil it y1 ￿ p .W h e n col-
lusi on d i d no t ta k ep l ac e the sign al s = b is rec ei v e dw i th proba bil it y q , whi le the signa l
s = n i s rec ei v ed with pro babil it y1 ￿ q , where 0 <q <p <1. Si nce q is sm al le r than p
a si gn a l s = b gi v es so m e indi cation that coll us i o n ha s o c curred. The signa l s, therefore,
con tains inform ati o n ab out the li k eli ness th at col lusion o cc u rre d. The pa ram e ters p and
q are com m o n kno wle dg e.
W e ass um e that the rep o rt r a nd the signa l s are v e ri￿able. The pri ncipal can ,
there fo re ,c o ndi tion her con tract on these o bserv able v ar i ab l es. C onseque n tly w em a y








) a nd the c on tra c tt ot h e
2
The ass um ption that o nl y the agen tc a n s end br i bes i s a si m pli fyi ng assum ption, whi ch is not c rucial
fo r the anal ysis.
3
The di￿er en tt r a ns f e r opp ortunities of the pla y e rs c an a lso b e i n te rpre ted as if t here exist di￿er en t
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= 0 confo rm L a ￿o n t and Tirol e (1991 ).5








), w he re the t w o subscripts de n ote the re p ort
r and the signal s re spe c tiv ely . Concerni ng ad m issible c on tra c ts w e as sum e that the
sup e rvisor’s li ab i li t yi sl im i ted to zero: In no ne o f the e v e n ts th e princi pa l can force the
sup e rvisor to m ak e a p ositi v e tran sfe r. F or the a gen tw e as sum e a \no sla v ery con di tion" :
The agen t ca nnot b e co n tra c tua l ly binded to exec ute the pro jec t. H ec a n at an y poi n t
in ti m ed e ci d e to ta k e the outside option not to undertak e the pro jec t. Consequen tly ,
the con tract w only sp eci ￿es p a y m en ts to the agen t conditi o nal on the re al isa ti on of the
pro jec t.






repre s e n t the pa y o ￿ functions o f the pri ncipal,
ag e n t an d sup ervi s or. W e as sum e tha t a l lp l a y ers are ri sk neutral and a l l outside o pti on s
a r e n or m al ize d to zero.
Tim i ng in the ga m e is a s follo ws:
t=1 : Nature c ho o ses th e c o st o f the pro je ct a nd re v e al s this to the a gen t a nd s up erv iso r.
t=2 : T he princi pa l o ￿ers a c on tra c t w 2 I R
4
+




supe rvisor. T he se c on tra c ts are pub l ic i nform ation.
t=3 : The su p erv iso r dec ides whether to acc ept the con tract.
t=4 : The su p erv iso r and agen t dec ide whether to c ol lude.
t=5 : The su p erv iso r re v e al s his rep o r t r .
t=6 : The signa l s i s rev eale d.
t=7 : The a gen td e cide s whether to exec ute the pro ject.
t=8 : P a y o ￿s a re re al ize d.
Note tha t sta ge 3 of the ga m ei s r edund an t. T he sup e rvi s or d o es not incur a n y
costs . A n y con tract t 2 I R
4
+
is there fo re indiv idual rationa l a nd wil lb ea c c epted b y the
sup e rvisor.
In sta ge 7 the ag e n t ha s to deci de whether to exe cute the p r oj ect. He wi ll do so i f
the w a ge he gets for reali zi n g the pro ject o ut w ei g hs the cos ts. A t s tage 7 the w a ge and
the cost are p erfec tly k no wn to hi m . C onsequen tly , his d e ci si o n is stra i gh tfo rw a rd. The
pro jec t is rea l iz ed when th e rel ev an tw ag e w is l a rger tha n or e qual to the cost c.W e
in tro duce the foll o wing t w oi nd i cato r functions, w hi c hw e wil l later use fo r expressing
















1 i f x ￿ c
h
0 otherwise.6
3 The Optim al Con trac t
Be nc h marks
Be for ed e rivi ng the o pti m al con tract fo r the g am e ,w ew i ll brie ￿y c om m en to ns i m pli ￿ed
v ersions of the m o del. This m a yh e lp to dev elop som ei n tuiti o n fo r the m ore com pli cated
ga m e.
When the pri ncipal do es not m ak e use of a su p erv iso r , sh e rec eiv es ne ither a re p ort
r nor the signa l s. T he optim a l co n tra c ti sg i v e nb y a degener a ted di rect m e c hanism .
The m ec ha ni sm i s de ge nerated i n the se n s et h a ti tp r e scrib es i den ti cal sc hedule st ob o t h
t y pe so f a g e n ts.
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I n the case that R ￿ c
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)i t is optim a l fo r the princ ipal to
o￿ e raw ag e w = c
h
i ndep enden t o f the ag e n t’s ann ouncem en t of his t yp e. U nd e r the
para m eter c o nstel lation R ￿ c
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Th e gam e is triv ial w he n the pl ay ers canno t forg e the rep ort. I n this case th e su-
p ervi so r m ust tr u thful ly rev eal the cos t of the pro jec t to the princ ipal. The con tract
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) a c hi ev es the ￿ r s t b est.





) do es no long e r a ttain the ￿ r s t b est. T he lo w cos t a gen t and the sup e rvisor will









) the princi pa l re cei v e s a r e por t r = h wha tev er the c o s to ft h e pro jec t and ha s an
ex pe c ted pa y o￿ of R ￿ c
h
.
When coll usion is p os sibl e, the princ ipal has t w o options. She can design the con tract
(w; t )i n suc haw a y that there is no s urpl us from co l ludi ng . W ew i ll de ￿ne suc ha
con tract a s coll us i o n-pro of. The sup er visor’s r ep ort is t ru thful and t h e pri ncipal can
m ak ee ￿e c tiv e use o f the re p ort. A second option is to all o w coll us i o n to ta k ep l ac e. In
this c a se coll us i on wi ll o c cur and the sup ervi s or’ s rep ort wi ll no t b e truthful.
5
In the
foll o wi ng w e ￿ rst sho wt ha t w em a y a ssum ew i tho ut loss of generali t y that there e xists
an o pti m al co n tra c t whic hi s collusi o n-pro of and com pute t h e optim al con tract. N ote
that i n this s e cti on w ei m pli ci tely assum e that the p ri nci pa l c a n ful ly com m it to her
con tracts a nd renegotiation d o es n ot ta k e place .
Col lusion -pr o ofn ess
4
As Ti role (19 92) note s the probl em i s iden tical to th e c l as si c al pri ci n g dec i si on of a m onop ol ist
who fa ce s t w ot yp es of consum er s with a di￿e ren tw i ll ingness to pa y bet w een whi ch she c a nnot pri ce -
discr i m i nate .
5
A furt her opti on w ould b e to al lo w coll us i on t o tak e place with a ce rtai n probabi li t y .W e her e
conc en trate o n pur e actions onl y .L a te r w e wil l com eb a ck to the i s sue of probabi li st i c col lusion.7
In o rder to ensure that coll usion do es not tak e place , the princi pa l ha s t od e si g n the
con tract (w; t ) in suc haw a y tha t there do es no t exi s t a surplus b et w e en the ag e n t and
the sup ervi s or from c ol luding. In princ iple the pri ncipal has to pre v e n tt w o form so f
coll usion . First, coll us i on m a yo c cur b et w een the lo w cos t ag en t and the sup e rvisor
and , s e cond, the hi gh c o st a ge n t and the s up ervi so r m a y coll ud e .S i nce in th e prese n t
m o del optim a l con tracts wil lb ew eakl ym onoto ni c inc reas i ng wi th the rep o r ted cost, the
rel ev an t threat of coll us i o n com e s from the lo w cost ag e n t. A lo w cos t ag e n tw i ll w an tt o
pas s f o r a high cost ag e n ti n order to get a higher w a ge. W ew i ll there fo re conce n trate on
coll usion b y the lo w cos t ag e n t a nd ex p os t c hec kw h e ther the o btaine d optim a l con tract
do es not i ndu c e coll us i on be t w e en the high c o st a gen t and s up ervi so r.
Whether coll us i on o ccurs dep e nds on t h e e￿ e ct whic h the rep ort ha s on the pa y o￿ s
of the agen t a nd sup e rvi s or. Let the pro ject b e of the l o w cost c = c
l
. Then, if the
sup e rvisor re p orts the cost tr u thful ly , thi s result s i na ne x pe c ted pay o￿ to the ag e n t and





























Co l lusion, on the other hand, i m pli es t h at a fo rged rep ort r = h is sen t. The exp ec ted





























By a ssum pti on c ol lusion canno t b e acc om pa ni ed b ya n e g ativ e transfer from the ag e n t







( w ). I n this cas e the a gen ti s w i ll ing to send a non-n e g ativ e brib e b of
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(w ). In o rde r for the su p erv iso r to coll ud e he ha s to r ecei v e
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In this cas e the m axi m um transfer the a gen t is will ing to g i v e for collusi o n is not eno ugh
to i nduce the sup erv isor to co op e ra te .W e can re wr i te conditi o n (1 ) as










































This leads to the follo wi ng de￿niti o n of co l lusion-pro ofness .8
De￿ni tion 1 Ac ontr ac t (w; t ) is c ol l usion-pr o of if and onl y if it s at is ￿ es the c ol lu s ion -
pr o ofn essc on s tr aint (2 ).
Prop osit ion 1 A ny p ay o￿ asso ciate dw i t hac ontr ac t (w; t ) c an al so b e att ai ne db ya
c o n t r a c t w hich is c ol l usion- pr o of.
Pro of: Co nsi de r a con tract (w; t ) whic hi s n ot c ol lusion-p r o o f, then co l lusion o ccurs
ei ther w he n the pro ject is lo w co st o r when the pro jec ti s high co st. I fc o l lusion ta k es
place w he n th e pro ject i sl o w cos t t he n the princ ipa l alw a ys rec ei v es a rep o rt r = h.I t






































)s a t i s ￿e s th e coll us i o n-pro ofness cons tr ai n t





is the sam e as for the con tract (w; t ) . A sim i lar a r gu m e n th o l ds for the case in whic h
the con tract( w; t )i s not c ol lusion-p ro o f with resp ect to th e h i gh cost pro j ect.
Q.E. D .
Pro po si tion 1 im pl ies tha t w em a y without l os s o f ge neralit y a ssum e tha t there e xists an
optim al con tract w hi c h is collusi o n-pro of. T h us , an optim a l con tract is a con tract ( ^ w;
^
t )
whic hm ax im i ze s
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) ) : ( 3 )
s u b jec tt o t h e coll us i o n-pro ofness cons trai n t (2). Tw o observ ations reg arding the optim al








= 0,s i nce the




an d the coll us i o n-pro ofness con strain ti s




dec reases. I ti m pl ies that i n the optim um the sup e rvisor
is not pai d for a re p ort r = h. Sec o nd, the collusi o n-pro ofness con strain t is bindi ng at
the optim um .I f the coll usion- pro ofness cons trai n td o e sn o tb i nd the n th e princi pa l is















W e can there fo re treat the w eak ine qua l it yi n (2 ) a s stri ct
eq ua l it y . Subs ti tuting (2) in to the ob je ctiv e functi o n (3 ) and rewri ting the ex press i on ,
le ad s t o
6
D ue to t he m onotoni ci t y of t he opti m al con trac t w eh a v e U
F
A
( w ) ￿ U
T
A









￿ 0 is not viol ated when t he





















































In the fo l lo wing the equi libri um will dep e nd on the param ete rc o nstel lation. T o
sim pl ify notation w ei n t r odu c e the fo l lo wi n g functi on
S ( a; b ) ￿ a (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
H
) ￿ b ￿ ￿ c: (5)
Prop osit ion 2 The optimal c ontr ac t (^ w;
^
t ) dep ends on the p ar a me ter c o n stel l ation in
the fol lowin g way


















t = (0 ; 0 ; 0; 0).




t )= ￿ ( R ￿ c
l
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)= ( k ￿ c; k ￿ c; 0 ; 0) .
7





￿ ( R ￿ c
l
)+( 1￿￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) ￿ k￿ ￿ c .

































) = ( kp ￿ c; k p￿c; 0; 0) . The pr inc ip al ’s ma x imum p ayo￿ is U
P
( ^ w ;
^
t ) =
￿ (R ￿ c
l
) + (1 ￿ ￿ )(1 ￿ q )(R ￿ c
h
) ￿ ￿ k (1 ￿ p)￿c.
Pro of: N ote that the ob jec tiv e funct ion in (4) is pi ece -w i se l i near in all w
i
and h as
non -p o si tiv e slop e s. The fun c tion sho w s an up w ard jum pa tc
l
for a l l w
i
(i =1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4)






.F rom these o bserv ations w e concl ude














g . W e















￿ ( R ￿ c
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￿ ( R ￿ c
l
)+( 1￿￿ )(R ￿ c
h















)=￿ ( R ￿ c
l
)+ ( 1￿ ￿ )(1 ￿ q )(R ￿ c
h















)=￿ ( R ￿ c
l
)+( 1￿￿ ) q ( R￿c
h
)￿p￿ k ￿ c .
First no te th at the con tract w
4
cann ot b e optim al .F or w
4
to a c hie v e the m ax i m um
















), whic hi se quiv ale n t
to the re quire m en t tha t the t w o co ndi tions q (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >p k ￿ ￿ c and (1 ￿ q )(1 ￿
7








, whic h has
an in tuiti v ei n terp retation: T h e pri n cipa li s not i n te res ted in t he sig nal s whe n the re p ort i s r = l . She
the n k no ws th a t the rep o rt i s t ruthful and the s i gnal s i s non-inf orm ati v e.10
. . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . .



















































































































































































































































































































































. . . .
. .
. . .
. . . .
. .














Fi gu re 1 : The o pti m al con tracts
￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) < (1 ￿ p)k￿ ￿ c ho l d. H o w ev er, sinc e0 <q <pw eh a v e tha t q (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >
pk ￿ ￿ c , (1 ￿ nu)(R ￿ c
h
) >k ￿ ￿ c ,(1 ￿ q )(1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) > (1 ￿ p)k￿ ￿ c . The t w o
conditi o ns a re the refore incom patibl ea n dw
4
c anno t b e o pti m al.









) , ￿ k ￿ c> (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h








) , p ￿k ￿ c>
q ( 1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h








) , (1 ￿ p )￿k ￿ c>(1 ￿ q )(1 ￿ ￿ )( R ￿ c
h
).
















) a nd the prop os i tion is
im m edi at e .F i na l ly no te that co l lusion b y the hi g h cost ag e n t a nd the sup ervi so r will
inde ed n ot o cc ur under the c on tracts whic h the prop ositi o n sp e ci￿e s.
Q . E . D.
Th e sta te m en t of prop os i tion 2 i s ill ustra te d in ￿gure 1. The diag ram depic ts the
regions in whic h the di ￿ ere n t con tracts are optim al. W ew i ll s hortly discuss eac ho f
the regions. I nr e gi o n I the princi pa l o ￿ers t h e agen ta p a ym en t c
l
indep enden t of the
supe rvisor’s re p ort r and the si g nal s. The princi pa l , the refore, do es not stric tly b e ne￿t
from e m plo yi ng th e sup erv isor a nd rec ei ving the signal s. Due to the m o noto ni cit yo f
the con tract, the ag e n tc a nnot ga i n from coll us i on an d w i ll no t brib e the sup e rvisor for
m i srep orti n g. T he princi pa l , there fo re , do es not need to giv e additi o nal i ncen tiv es to the
sup e rvisor fo r re p orting truthfull y .N o te tha t the pro je ct wil l only b e ex ecuted i n the
case o f lo w cos t. Th e refore, for the con tract to b e o pti m al th e e xp ecte d cost of fo re g oing
the pro je ct nee ds to b e sm all .T h i s is the ca se w he n the proba bil it y that the pro je ct
is l o w cost is hi gh ( ￿ close to one), and when the su rpl us fro m ex ecuti ng t h e high cost
pro jec ti sl o w( R ￿ c
h
sm all ).
In reg i on I I it is o pti m al f o r the pri ncipal to conditi o n the agen t’ sp a ym en to nt h e11
sup e rvisor’s rep o rt. This w a y the princ ipal trie s to discri m inate b et w e en lo w a nd high
cost pro jects. Since t he ag e n t’s pa ym e n t dep ends on the sup e rvi s or’s rep ort, there e xists
scop e for coll us i o n: The lo w cost ag e n tw ould li k e to pa ss for a high c os t a ge n t. In
order to prev en tc ol lusion the princi pa l o ￿ers a n inc en ti v ec om pa ti ble con tract to the
sup e rvisor to i ndu c e truthful re p orting. The e xp ecte dc o st of this con tract i s ￿k ￿ c . The
con tract wil l b e optim al when c ol lusion is no t to o costly to prev en t. This im pl ie s that
k s hould b e s m al l. Sinc e the princi pa l co ndi tions her c on tract only on the re p ort r ,w e
wil l refe r to this con tract a s the pa rti al -s c reeni ng con tract.
In re g i on III i ti s o pti m al to c o ndi tion the agen t’ sp a ym e n t not only o n the sup er visor’s
rep ort but a l so on t h e si gn al s.B yu s i ng this full -s c reeni n g con tract co l lusion b ec om es
le ss attracti v e fo r the ag e n ta sc o m pa re d to the partial-scree ning con tract, wh i c hi s
optim al i n reg i on I I . The ex pe c ted costs of prev en ti ng coll usion i st h us re du c ed b ya
factor p to p￿ k ￿c. The pri nc ipal wi ll prefer full - scre ening to pa r tial-scree ni ng if c ol lusion
is relati v e ly cos tl y to prev en t (i. e. a large k ). The dra wba c k o f the c on tra c ti s, h o w ev er,
that the a gen t doe s no t exe cute the pro je ct w he n the cos t is c
h
a nd th e signal i s s =
b.T h e refore, f o r the c on tr a c tt ob eo p t i m al i tm ust b e tha t this e v en to c c u rs with a
reaso nably s m al lp r o babili t y a nd when it o ccurs the princi pa l sho ul d no t ca re to o m uc h.
This i m pli es that the pro babil it y that a pro jec ti s o f high cost m ust b e sm all (i .e. ￿
large) a nd tha t the signa l s i s su￿ci en tl y inform ativ e (i. e. the ra ti o q=p i ss m all ), whil e
the p ri nci pa l ’s wil li ng ness to ex ecute a high cost pro jec t( R ￿ c
h
)m u s t be no t t oo hi gh .
These conditions are re￿e cted b y the constra i n t S (q; p k) ￿ 0 , whic hi s the l o w er curv e
in the ￿g ure . On the o the r ha nd the pri nci pa l ’s wil lingness to pa y R shou l d b e large
enoug h for the pri ncipal not to fo rgo the pro jec te n ti rely whenev er i ts cost i s c
h
. This is
ensured b y th e cond i tion S (1 ￿ q; (1 ￿ p)k ) ￿ 0, re pr e sen ted i n the ￿g ure b y the upp er
curv e.
An i n tere st i ng observ ation is tha t the princi pa l prev en ts coll usion b y setti ng the a p-
prop ri ate inc en ti v e s to the sup e rvisor ra the r tha n to the ag e n t. T he in tui tion b e hi nd this
result is tha t it i sc heap e rt oi n duc e truth tell ing b y givi ng the ince n tiv es to t h e sup e rvisor
than to g i v e these inc en ti v e s to the ag e n t. Refer ring to the coll usion- pro ofness cons tr ai n t
(1), the pri nc ipal can ei ther prev en t coll us i on b y incre as i ng the m ini m al brib e whi c hi s
acce pt ed b y the s up ervi so r (b
min
), or b y dec reas i ng the m axi m al brib e w hi c h the ag e n t
is wil li ng to giv e for induci ng c ol lusion (b
max
). Due to the c o stl y bribi ng t e c hnolog y the
e￿ec t of reduci ng b
max
b y one u ni ti s e qual to inc reas i ng b
min
wi th k units. Incre a sing
b
min
i s, therefore, a factor k c heap er than re ducing b
max
.
No w a ssum e that the param ete rc o nstel lation is s uc ht h a ti ti s optim a l for the princi pa l
to use ful l scre ening. I n this c a se the pri nc ipal do es no t m ak e full use of the sup er visor’s12
inform ati o n. When the p r inci pa l rece iv es a re p ort r = h and a signa l s = b , sh e div erges
from the su p erv iso r’ s inform ation and sets a tra nsfer c
l
to the ag e n t. When the actua l
cost of the pro je ct i s c
h
then this giv es ri se to an ine ￿ci ency . The ag e n ti s pro m ised a
trans fe r c
l
for reali zi n g the pro j ect, b ut d e cl ines the o￿er, sinc eh i sc os t i s larg e r tha n c
l
.
The agen t d o es there fo r e not real ize the pro j ect, ev en though the pri ncipal’ s wil li n gness
to pa y R i s greater tha n the cos t of the pro je ct c
h
. T he optim al c on tra c tl ea v es scop e
fori ne￿ cie ncie s, wh i c ho c cur w i th a pro babil it y( 1 ￿ ￿ ) q .
4 Re nego tiation
The ex - p os t i ne￿c ienc y pro m pts us to lo ok at rene g otiation a nd c om m itm en t. The
im p ortan to b s e rv at i on i s that when the princ ipal uses full -s c reeni ng and rece iv es a re p ort
r = h and a s i g nal s = b she kno ws that the actual cos t of the pro je ct is c
h
. T os e e this
le t the pri ncipal rece iv e a r e por t r = h a nd a signa l s = b. She then kno ws tha t the




. B ut sinc e the con tra c ti sc o l lusion-pro of she
kno ws that the rep o rt is tru t hf u l and she, there fo re ,m ust c on c lude th at the c o st of the
pro jec t i s inde ed c
h
. A s a conseque n c e s he re al ize s that the ag e n tw i ll re fus e to e xec ute









.T h i sc h ange
is also w e ak l y prefe rred b y the a gen t and is th e refore a P a reto im pro v em en t.




, where w e
all ow th e princ ipal to prop ose a new c on tra c t w and in whic h the a gen tm a y deci de to
acce p t the new con tract o r to stic k to the o l d con tract. I n sta ge 7 the a gen t deci des
whether to e xec ute the pro j ect giv en the con tract w hi c hi sr e l ev an t a t that stag e .
A t the rene g otiation sta ge the princi pa l form sa b e l ie f a b ou t th e cost o f the pro ject.
Let ￿ (w; t ;r ;s )r epresen tt h e princi pa l ’s b eli ef that the cost o f th e pro ject i s c
l
gi v e n the
con tract (w; t ) , the re p ort r and the signa l s. Then w e can de ￿ ne renego ti at ion -pro ofness
in the foll o wi ng w a y .
De￿ni tion 2 Ac ontr ac t (w; t ) is r ene g otiation- pr o of if it satis￿e s for a ll r 2f h; lg and
s 2f b; ng
(a) (R ￿ c
l




(b) (R ￿ c
l







Co nditi o n a ) sta te s tha t w he n the pri nci pa l at ta c hes p o si tiv e proba bi li t y to the e v e n t
that the pro je ct is o f l o w cost then s he shou l d o ￿er a t l eas t a pay m en t c
l
for exe cuting13
the pro je ct. The se con d c o ndi tion s tates that w he n the princi pa l b e li ev es s he rece iv es
a hi g her ex pe c ted p a y o￿ from o￿ering a w ag e c
h
i ns t e ad of o￿ eri ng le ss tha n c
h
, then
she s hould a t least o￿er a p a y m en t c
h
. I ti so b v ious that when t he se c o ndi tions a re not
sa ti s￿ed b y a con tract (w; t ) then there exi s ts a con ti n genc y in whic h the c on tra c ti s
r ene g otiated. When the t w o co ndi tions are sa ti s￿ e dn o s u c h con tingency e xists.
Prop osit ion 3 A ny p ayo￿ asso c iate dw i th a c o nt r act w hi c h is not r en e gotiation- pr o of
c an also b e achie ve db yac ont r act which is r en e gotiation -pr o of.
Pro of: Consider a con tract (w; t ) whic hi s no t renego t iation- pro o f. Then i ti s com m on
kno wle dg e tha t this con tract w i ll b e rene g otiated in to a con tract (w
0
;t ) a tal at e r sta ge.
Rational it y wil l ensure that all pla y ers act a s i f the rele v an t con tract is the con tract
(w
0
;t ). C onsequen tly the pa y o￿s under the con tract (w; t ) a nd the con tract (w
0
;t ) are
ide n tic al .
Q . E . D.
I t f ol l o w s d i r ectl y tha t w em a y a ssum e without l os s o f ge nera l it y th at the optim al
con tract is renegotiation-p ro o f.
In equi li br i um the princi pa l ’s b el ie fs sho ul d b e cons i sten t with the b eha v ior of the
ag e n t an d sup ervi s or. Since the sup e rvisor a nd ag e n td on o tc ol lude giv en the con tract
(^ w;
^
t ), c o nsi st e ncy of b eli efs req ui res that ￿ (^ w;
^
t ;r ;s )= 0 f o r r =h an d s = n; b.A s a
















in o rde r to b e rene g otiation-p ro o f. This i m pli es tha t indep enden t of the
para m eter cons te ll at i o n the optim al c ol lusion- pro o f con tract whi c h is also re ne g oti at i on -













Another im plic at i on o f p r opo si tion 3 i s that propos i tion 1 no l o nger nee ds to ho l di n
the ex tended ga m ew i th renego t iation. I n o rder to pro v e prop o siti o n1w e used the fact
that for ev ery n on-coll us i o n-pro of con tract one ca n ￿n d a c ol lusion-p r o o f con tract whic h
ac hi ev es the sa m ep a y o ￿. It is, ho w ev er, not ensured that o ne can ￿ nd for ev ery no n-
coll usion -pro of c on t ra ct w hi c h is rene g otiation-pro o f a c ol lusion-pro o f con tract whic h
is a l so renegotiation- pro o f. W e the refore can no l o nger a ssum e tha t there e xists an
optim al c on t ra ct whi c h is coll usion -pro of and m ust a l s o cons i der con tracts whic h are not
coll usion -pro of.
Prop osit ion 4 The o pt im al c ontr ac t in the g ame w i th r en e gotiation d ep e nds on the
p ar ame ter c onste l lation in the fol lowin g way :14
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F igure 2 : The o pti m al con tracts w i th renego ti at i on
i) I f S (1 ￿ q; (1 ￿ p)k ) < 0 th e n the optimal c on tr act is neithe r c onditione do nt h e
r ep or t r nor on the signal s.T he princip al’s max im um p ayo￿ is U
P
= ￿ (R ￿ c
l
).
ii) If S (1 ￿ q; (1 ￿ p )k ) ￿ 0 and S (q; k + p ￿ 1) > 0 the n the optimal c on tr act is
c ol lusion -pr o of. The optimal c ontr a c ti sc on ditione d on the r ep ort r , b ut not on the
sign al s. The princ ip al’s ma x imum p a yo￿ is U
P
= ￿ (R ￿ c
l
) + (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) ￿ ￿ k ￿ c.
iii) If S (1 ￿ q; (1 ￿ p )k ) ￿ 0 and S (q; k + p ￿ 1) ￿ 0 then the op ti m al c ont r act is not
c ol lusion -pr o of. T he optimal c on tr act is c onditione do nb oth t h er ep or t r a n d the sign a l s.
The pri n cip al’s maximum p ayo￿ is U
P
= ￿ p (R ￿ c
l
) + [ ￿ (1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ ￿ )(1 ￿ q )] (R ￿ c
h
).
Pro of: Th e p r opo si tion foll o w s fro m a sta i gh tfo rw ar d c om pa ri so n be t w een the m ax i m um
pa y o￿ wh i c h can b e a c hie v e d in the se t o f renego ti at i on -pro of c on tracts whic h are not
coll usion -pro of (calc ul ated in the a pp endix) and the m ax im um pa y o￿ whic hc an be
ac hi ev ed in the s e t of rene g otiation- and c ol lusion-pro of c on tra c ts .
Q.E. D.
F i gure 2 depi cts the r eg i on s for whic h the di￿eren t con tracts a re op ti m al. I n region
I it i so pti m a l for the pri ncipal to o￿ e ra￿ a tw ag e i ndep e nden t of the rep ort r and the
signa l s. The pa y o ￿ as so c iated with t hi s con tract i se qual to the m ax i m um pa y o￿ o f the
princ ipal i n the gam ew i tho ut re nego ti at i on . I n fact under this pa ram e ter c o nstel lation
the princ ipal is no t in tereste di ne m plo y ing a s up ervi so r or re cei vi n g the signa l s.
In region I I the princi pa l o￿ers a c ol lusion-pro o f con tract in equi li br i um . The region
can b e divi ded in to t w o s ubregi o ns. The area I Ia depi cts the region in whi c h the optim al
con tract is ide n tic a l to the o pti m al c on tra c t whic hw e o btaine d in the ga m e without
rene g otiation. Co nseque n tly , also the pa y o￿ s ar e the sam e i n bot h g a m es. In t h e region15
I Ib the optim a l con tra c t in the ga m ew i th renegotiation di ￿e rs from the optim a l con tract
in the g am e without re nego ti at i o n. When the princ ipal can com m it no t to rene g otiate she
o￿ er s a co n tra c tw h i c h also c o ndi tions the agen t’ sc on tract on the s i gn al s. Th e con tract
is, ho w e v e r, no t ex-p o st e￿c ien t and there fore not renego ti at ion -pro of. As a c o nseq uence,
it will b e re ne g oti a ted in the g am e with re nego ti at i o n and i sn o l o nger o pti m al. Instead
it i s optim a l fo r the p ri nci p al to o￿ er a di￿eren t collusi o n-pro of con tra c t. It foll o ws that
them ax im um pa y o ￿ of the pri ncipal is lo w e r in th e ga m e with re nego ti at i o n than i n the
ga m ew i tho ut rene g otiation.
Th e m o sti n te resting area i sr e gi on III . F or this re gi o n the o pti m al con tract also
di￿ers from th e optim al con tract i n the ga m e wit h out re ne g otiati o n. This i m pl ies that
the pri ncipal’ sm axim um pa y o￿ has a l s o dec reas e d. In the li terature on renego t iation this
i sag e neral resul t. The reaso n b eing that in a g am ew i th renegotiation the princ ipa l ha s a
sm all er set o f c on tra c ts to whi c h she ca n com m i t. The i n te resting p oin t here is, ho w ev er,
that the optim al c on tra c tc ha nges from a coll us i o n-pro of con tract to a c on t ra ct whic hi s
n o t c o l l u s i o n - pro of. Th e reaso n i s tha t when the princ ipal do e s o ￿er the coll us i o n-pro of
con tract, whic hi so p t i m al in th e ga m ew i tho ut renego ti ation, she m a y o btain inform ation
whic hw i ll l ead her to re nego ti a te the c on tra c t. This fa c ti sc om m on kno wl edg e and
induce s the sup e rvisor and the ag e n tt o c ha nge th e ir b e ha vior ex a n te. The princ ipal is
b etter o￿ e ns uri ng that s he do es no t obta i n the inform ati on , i n o rde r n ot to c hang e the
b eha vior of the sup e rvisor and the agen t. Not ob tai ni ng the i nfo rm at i on m eans that she
do es not o￿e r a coll us i o n-pro of con tract.
S tr ongv e r su s we ak r en e gotiation -pr o ofn ess
Note tha t in the a b o v e discussion w eu s e d the c on c ept of stron g re nego ti at i o n-pro of
con tracts.
8
I f w e r equire con tracts to b e only w eakly renegotiation- pro o f the na l s o other
eq ui li bria in the renegotiation g am ee xist. T o see this, no te that g i v en th e full-scre ening
con tract t h e sup e rvisor an d the ag e n t are in fact i ndi￿eren tb e t w e en col luding and no n-
coll uding. Whil ew e a ssum e d tha t co l lusion w ould n ot tak e place giv en the con tract
(w; t ), an a l ternativ e b est resp o nse f o r the a gen t a nd t h e sup erv isor w ou l dh a v eb e en to
coll ude. In tha t case the con tract (w; t ) is rene g otiation-p ro o f.
Le t the sup e rvi s or a nd the a gen tc ol lude with pro babil it y ￿ gi v e n the con tract (w; t ).
In cas e the princ ipal rece iv e sar e p ort r = h and a signa l s = b she up da te s her b e lie f
8
A con trac t i s strong re negoti ation-pro of if t here do es no t exist an y equil ibrium in the r ene g otiati on
gam ef or whic h the con trac t i sn o t rene go ti ati on-pro of. A w ea kly re negoti atio n-pr o o f con trac t re q ui re s
that the re e xi s t an equil ibrium for whic h the con tract is r ene g otiati on-pro of. Se e Maskin a nd T i role
(199 2)16
according to Ba y es’ rul e
￿ (w ; t; h; b )=
￿p￿
￿p￿ + q ( 1 ￿ ￿ )
: ( 6 )
I t f o l l o ws that the c on tra c t( w; t )i sr e nego ti at i o n pro of if an d only i f
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿





T h e a s s o ci ated p a y o￿ for the pri ncipal i s
U
P
(w ; t; ￿ )=￿ (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
l
￿ k ￿ c(1 ￿ p)) + ￿￿ p ( R ￿ c
l
)
+ ￿￿ ( 1 ￿ p )(R ￿ c
h
) + (1 ￿ ￿ )(1 ￿ q )(R ￿ c
h
): (7)
Prop osit ion 5 L et th ep ar amete r c o n stel l ation b es u c ht h at S (1 ￿ q; (1 ￿ p)k ) ￿ 0 and
S (q; pk ) ￿ 0 then the ful l scr e e nin g c on tr act (w; t ) with ￿> ￿ ￿ is an e quil i br iu m outc ome
in the game with r ene g otiation.
Pro of: W e kno w that the ful l scree ni ng con tract (w; t ) is renego t iation- pro o f if ￿> ￿ ￿ .I n
o r d e r f o r the outcom e( w ; t; ￿ ) with ￿>￿ ￿ to b e subg am e p erfec tw e need tha t U
P
(w ; t; ￿ )




) f o r a l l
￿> ￿ ￿ . Since U
P

















( w ; t; ￿ ) fo r all ￿< 1.
Q.E. D .
Th e fact that c ol lusion has to o cc u r with at l eas t a p r o babili t y￿ ￿ is ag ai n expl ai ned
b yr e ferri ng to the inform ati v ec on ten t of the con tract (w; t ) . In order for the princi pa l
not to renegotiate, s he m a y no t a ttac h to o high a proba bi lit yt o the sta te of the w or ld
b eing c = c
h
wh e n she rece iv es the re p ort r = h a nd the si g nal s = b.W h e n she o ￿ers
the con tra c t( w; t ) a nd the sup e rvisor and ag en t coll ude wi th pro babil it y￿ ￿ her up dated
b eli ef (6 ) m ak es her indi ￿e ren tb e t w ee n prop osing the pa rt ial-scree ni ng con tract in the
rene g otiation-s tage and no t re nego ti at i ng . Whe n the ag e n t and the sup e rvisor coll ude
with a hi gh e r proba bi li t y than ￿ ￿ , the princi pa l ’s b e lie f abou t t h e c o st o f the pro je ct is
suc h that i t is stri ctl y b ett er fo r her not to renegotiate.
Finall y no te that an ye q ui li brium outcom e with ￿< 1g i v es the princi pa l a s tri ctl y
higher pa y o￿ than h e rp a y o￿ as so c iated w i th the o pti m al con tract in pro p os i tion 2.
5 C on clus ion
This pa p er sho w ed that wh e n the princi pa l renegotiates ex p os t i ne￿c ien t con tracts then
under c ertain para m eter co ndi tions the optim al con tract i sn e cessarily no t collusi on -
pro of. Whe n the p ri nci pa l ca n c om m it not renegotiate ex p os t i ne￿c ie n t con tracts, then17
there ex ists a n o pti m al c on tra c t whic hi sc ol lusion-pro o f rega r dl ess of the pa ram et er
constell at ion . The op t im al con tract m a y ,h o w ev er, pro du c ee xp o s ti n e ￿ci enci es.
In o rder to ex plain the re su l tw er e fer to t w op r inci ples. Fi rst there e xists the pri nc ipl e
of re neg oti at i on . Th i s princ iple sa ys tha t fo r ev ery non- re nego ti at i o n-pro of c on tra c t the re
ex ists a c on tract whi c hi sr e neg oti at i o n-pro of with ide n tic al p a y o￿ s. Second, there e xists
the pri ncipl e of collusi o n-pro ofness . T hi s pri nci pl es a ys tha t for ev ery n on-coll us i o n-pro of
con tract there exi st s a con tract whic h is coll us i o n-pro of with ide n tic a l pay o￿ s. W eh a v e
sho w n that in the ga m e without renego t iation th e princi ple of coll us i on -pro ofness ho l ds .
As a direc t con se quence t he re ex ists a n op ti m al c on t ra ct whi c hi sc o l lusion- pro o f. W e
ha v e further sho wn tha t w he n the princ ipal c a nnot com m i t not to renego ti at e , the n the
princ iple of rene g otiation tak e s prece dence o v e r the pri ncipl eo fc ol lusion-p ro o fne s s and
the l a tte r princi ple m a y fail to hold. The c r u xo ft h em atter i s that when one trie st o ￿nd
the collusi o n-pro of coun te rpa rt o f a no n-coll us i o n-pro of c on tra c t, th e n the coll us i o n-pro of
con tract m a y not b e renego ti ation- pro of e v e n th ough the no n-coll usion- pro o f c on tra c ti s
r e n e g o t i a t i o n -pro o f .T h i se xplains w h y the re m a y no t exi st an optim al c on tra c t whic h
is coll us i on -pro of.
W em a y giv ea na l terna t iv ee xplana ti o n fo r o ur result. It w a s sho wn that when a
coll usion -pro of con tract is o￿ ere d t he pr inci pa l re cog ni zes the ine ￿ci ency and w an ts to
rene g otiate. In con tras t the p ri nci pa l is no t certain enou gh ab o ut th e i ne￿c ienc yt o
rene g otiate when she o ￿ers a c on tra c tw h i c hd o e si nduce coll usion. Since the princi pa l ’s
attitude to w ard rene g otiation is c om m on k no wl edge, i ta ￿ e c ts the b e ha vior of pla y ers
ex an te. T hi sw orsens the princ ipal’ s situation b y suc h a degree that she i sb e tter o ￿
all owi ng coll usion to ta k ep l a ce instead of prev en ti ng i t. It is the fact tha t a con tract
is c ol lusion-pro o f wh i c h inform s the princi pa l ab out the actual s tate o f the w orld and
m ak es h e r full ya w a re o f the i ne￿c ienc y . The i nf or m at i on e m b o die di n th e collusi on -
pro of con tract i sh a r m ful to the pri ncipal. I n ter pr e ting the re su l ti nt h i sw a yi t b e c om es
cl ear tha t the re su l ti sc l o sel yl i nk e d to a gene ra l th e m ei ng a m e - the o ry that inform ation
m a yw o rsen a p l a y er’s situation, when i ti sc o m m on kno wl edge tha t thi sp l a y e rh a s
inform ati on . Extra inform ation c ha nges the b eha vi or of a p l a y er a nd thi sc hang e is
an tic ipated b y o the rp l a y e rs i n the ga m e. I n the pre se n t pa p er o btaini ng inform ation is
eq ui v alen tt oo ￿ e ring a col lusion- pro o f con tract. Since the princ ipa l i sa w are tha t the
ex tra i nfo rm at i on w o rsens her situation, she wil l not o ￿er a coll usion- pro of c on tract.
Instead s he all o ws col lusion to ta k e place .18
App endix : The optim al non-collus io n - pro of c on tract
In thi s a pp endix w e com pute the optim al co n tra c t whic hi sn o t c o l lusion-pro of. N ote
that this cas e do e s no t reduce to the s i tua ti on without a sup e rvisor, si nce b ye m pl o ying
the s up ervi so r the pri ncipal s ti ll rec ei v es th e signal s. Fi rs t w ec al cul a te the optim al
c o n t r a c t i n the gam ew i tho ut re nego ti at i on . Then w e sho wt h a tt h i s con tract is also
rene g otiation-pro o f i n the gam e with rene g otiation.
If th e ag e n t and the s up ervi so r co l lude then the rep o rt do es not con tain a n yi nf or m a-
tion, b ecause wha te v e r the cost of the pro je ct the sam e rep ort i ss e n t. C onsequen tly , the
rep ort is un i nform ativ e to the pri nc ipal a nd she wil l o￿er the le a st cos tl yc on tra c t whic h
the s up erv iso r a c cepts, i .e. t =( 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0). Without l o ss of gene ra l it yw e as sum e that
it is the l o w co st agen t and the sup e rvisor who c ol lude. This im pli es tha t t h e princi pa l
alw a ys rec eiv es a re p ort r = h . The princ ipal’s pa y o￿ i s
U
P






























.W h e n the l o w cost ag e n ta l w a ys
















do a￿ ec t th e d e ci si o n regard i ng c ol lusion.
Th e f u nc tion U
P
(w ) i s a discon tin uo us, pi ece -w i se l ine a r functi o n. Again w eh a v e four
cases to consider.






. The p r inci pa l do es not try to s c reen b et w ee n the hi gh c o st and
the lo wc o st pro ject. I ns te ad sh e o ￿e rs a trans fe r c
l
irre spe c tiv e of the re p ort and




￿ ￿ ( R ￿ c
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. The con tract results in a pa y o￿ of U
b
P
￿ R ￿ c
h
. The
princ ipal do es no t try to scr een b e t w ee n the hi g h and the l o w cost pro je ct. She
o￿e rs a tra nsfer c
h










. The princi pa l us e s the signa l s i n order to s c reen b e t w e en
high a nd lo w cost pro je cts. Under the con tract w
b
a pro jec ti s not exe cuted when
i ti so f h i g h cost a nd the p ri nci pa l observ es s = b . This o cc urs with pro babil it y
(1 ￿ ￿ )q .T h e e xp ecte dp a y o￿ i s U
c
P
￿ ￿p ( R ￿ c
l
)+ ￿ (1 ￿ p)(R ￿ c
h
)+ ( 1￿ ￿ )(1 ￿
q )(R ￿ c
h
).19








.I n this ca se the pri ncipal a l so u ses the signa l s as a
s c r e e n i n g dev ice . The exp ecte dp a y o￿ i s U
d
P
￿ ￿ p( R ￿ c
h
) + ￿ ( 1 ￿ p) ( R ￿ c
l
) + ( 1 ￿
￿ ) q ( R ￿ c
h
). T he pro je ct is no t ex ecuted when it is of hi g h cost a nd the princi pa l
obs e rv e s the signa l s = n.T h i s o ccurs w i th pro babili t y( 1 ￿ ￿ )(1 ￿ q ).


























dep en d s on the p ar amete r c o n stel l ation in t h e fol l o w ing way,





























Pro of: Co m paring the pri nc ipal’ sp a y o￿ s un de r the di￿eren tw age c on t ra ct s leads to
the o bserv ation that the c on tra c ti n c a s e d )c a nnot b e optim al. It w ou l d req uire tha t the
princ ipal’s p a y o￿ i s larger than in cas e a) a nd cas e b), whic h is equiv ale n tt om eeti ng the
conditi o ns (1 ￿ q ) (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) < (1 ￿ p )￿ ￿c a nd q (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) > p ￿ ￿ c. Ho w ev er,
since 0 <q <pit ho l ds that q (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >p ￿ ￿ c)(1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >￿ ￿ c)
(1 ￿ q )(1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) > (1 ￿ p)￿ ￿c.T h e t w oc o ndi tions are therefore i nco m pa ti ble .







, (1 ￿ q )(1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h






,q (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >p ￿ ￿ c ,
whil ei t holds that S (q; p) > 0 ) q(1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >p ￿ ￿ c)(1 ￿ q ) (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
) >
(1 ￿ p )￿ ￿c ) S (1 ￿ q; 1 ￿ p ) > 0. T he prop ositi o n is then im m edi at e .
Q.E. D.
Prop osit ion 7 The optimal c on tr acts in p r op osition 6 ar er ene g otiation- pr o of.






is re ne g oti at i on -












it fo l lo ws b yB a y e s’ rul e
that
￿ (w ; t; h; b)=
p￿
p￿ + q (1 ￿ ￿ )
: (9)
Note tha t the con tract w
c
is optim al wh e n p￿ ￿ c ￿ q (1 ￿ ￿ )(R ￿ c
h
). T hi s cond i tion
tog e ther with e quation (9 ) leads to the concl us i on tha t when th e con tract w
c
is optim al
in the se t of non- c ol lusion- pro o f c on t ra ct s then i ti sa l so rene g otiati o n-pro of. By the






is the optim al
non -col lusion- pro o f con tract then it i s also re ne g oti at i o n-pro of.
Q.E. D.20
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